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Abstract 
The relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is characterized 
by a persistent potential for disruptions in implementation, such as ‘biopiracy’ conflicts, 
because of the agreements’ incompatible provisions on property rights over genetic resources. 
The lack of consolidation is often explained by attempts to strategicallly exploit interplay 
between the two institutions. Countries of the North and the South are said to push for 
provisions under their preferred agreement in order to circumvent obligations under the other. 
We develop an alternative explanation based on a conception of international negotiators 
acting as agents of particular interest groups rather than as representatives of the state as a 
whole. Using a Two-level Games model of independent negotiations for agreements on 
functionally interdependent issues, we analyze the incentives for negotiators to delay or 
prevent consolidation for strategic reasons. Our analysis shows that, under certain conditions, 
persistent disruption may be due to a strategic dilemma that prevents negotiators from taking 
initiatives for consolidation. 
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1 Introduction 
The relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) has been subject 
to intense political and scientific debate ever since the two agreements came into force in the 
first half of the 1990ies. At the basis of these discussions are incompatible rules regulating 
property rights over genetic resources on the one hand, and provisions for the international 
harmonization of intellectual property rights (IPRs) over biotechnological innovations on the 
other. Incompatibilities of these provisions are held responsible for problems, conflicts and 
inefficiencies in the implementation of the two agreements (Bhat 1999; Droege and Soete 
2001; Cullet 2001; Dutfield 1999). In most cases these conflicts concern the distribution of 
benefits from the commercial use of genetic resources. While the CBD entitles holders of 
such resources to share the benefits arising out of their commercial use, TRIPS does not 
explicitly recognize these rights and lacks provisions that would allow their implementation. 
From a reverse angle, the CBD does not consider that legislation on access to genetic 
resources and on the granting of intellectual property rights should not discriminate between 
potential users in order to be consistent with the provisions of the WTO and the TRIPS 
agreement (Rosendal 2006). The conflicts arising out of these issues and resulting 
impediments to implementation have raised concerns about the impacts of the CBD-TRIPS 
relationship on the effectiveness of the two agreements, particularly with regard to the 
conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources. Despite a number of initiatives to 
consolidate the provisions of the two agreements, little progress has been made to date.1 
An explanation that is often put forward is that states are exploiting the incompatibility 
between the two agreements in order to circumvent the implementation of costly 
commitments. This view maintains that industrialized countries of the North, where most of 
the users of genetic resources are located, use TRIPS in order to maintain access to genetic 
resources free and unrestricted and to avoid obligations for benefit sharing. Likewise, the 
poorer countries of the South that are the hosts to most of the world’s biodiversity are accused 
                                                 
1  See WTO documents IP/C/W/368, 370 and 420 (available at: http://docsonline.wto.org). Submission 420 refers to more 
than 25 communications that have been submitted on the subject to date. The need to clarify the relationship has also 
been recognized by the 2002 WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration (Article 19). A few months later, the World Summit for 
Sustainable Development Plan of Implementation confirmed the need to address the relationship and mandated the CBD 
to negotiate an international regime on access and benefit sharing (para 42.o). 
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of using the CBD to implement discriminative restrictions on access to genetic resources and 
to avoid their obligations under TRIPS to grant intellectual property rights over 
biotechnological innovations. This explanation gives an intuitive reason why negotiations 
over property rights to genetic resources are subject to political controversy. It can also 
explain to a large extent why the negotiations in two different arenas resulted in the 
emergence of incompatible property rights regimes; nevertheless, addressing the CBD-TRIPS 
relationship in terms of a North-South conflict may be inadequate for two reasons. 
First, it assumes that states are homogenous actors with a single preference function that 
allows them to pursue complex objectives simultaneously in different forums. This implies 
that states are either users (North) or suppliers (South) of genetic resources, ignoring that 
many, if not all, countries are both and may therefore be affected by internal divisions about 
the desired outcomes of international negotiations. The recent CBD negotiations on an 
international regime on access and benefit sharing show that some countries who used to be 
only providers of genetic resources are increasingly acting as both providers and users. Some 
countries with fast growing biotechnology sectors, such as Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia and 
China, have recently changed their positions. While still maintaining a strong position on the 
general need for a strong international regime, they are now searching for an approach that 
will secure their rights as providers without compromising their opportunities as users (IISD 
2005; 2006). One of the consequences is that coalitions of provider countries find it 
increasingly difficult to coordinate their positions. The group of Like-Minded Megadiverse 
Countries, which was expected to be a strong advocate of the international regime turned out 
to be “as diverse in opinions as in biodiversity” (IISD 2005: 11). This development cannot be 
captured with an explanation based on a dichotomy labeling countries as either users or 
suppliers of genetic resources. 
Second, even if the confrontation was one between user and supplier states, their interests 
should be sufficiently asymmetric to allow the negotiation of a compromise agreement, at 
least in the long run. At one point the technology-rich but resource-poor countries of the 
North and the technology-poor but resource-rich countries of the South would agree on 
mutually beneficial exchanges of resources and technologies and establish an agreement that 
prevents free-riding on either side. Young (2002) argues that conflicts about the compatibility 
of rules in areas of functional overlap are not purely a technical matter, but will also generate 
conflicts of interest among influential actors in the affected issue areas, as economic actors 
clash with interest groups concerned about issues such as sustainable resource use and equity 
in the distribution of benefits. Therefore, we need to consider the possibility that interplay is 
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not only an unintended consequence of interdependent issues, but that it may also result from 
conscious decisions of the negotiating actors about the framing of an issue, taking into 
account the interests of the principal actors involved in the process. 
In this paper, we seek to develop an explanation that goes beyond the North-South 
dichotomy of state interest and accounts for the influence of domestic dynamics in 
international negotiations. We view the relationship between CBD and TRIPS as a case of 
persistent disruptive interplay that can be explained by taking into account the influence of 
domestic interest groups on the ability of negotiators to make proposals for consolidation. The 
next two sections briefly review the phenomenon of interplay in general and in the 
relationship between the CBD and TRIPS. Section 4 takes a closer look on the underlying 
interdependence of property rights over genetic resources. In section 5, we develop a simple 
Two-level Games model of parallel negotiations leading to agreements with substantial 
potential for disruptive interplay. We use this model to analyze the incentives negotiators may 
have to strategically exploit disruptive interplay and to subsequently prevent the reconciliation 
of disruptive effects. We illustrate the analysis with the CBD-TRIPS relationship, one of the 
most prominent cases of persistent disruption. 
2 Disruptive Interplay Between International Institutions 
As the number of international institutions rises, the phenomenon of institutional interplay is 
becoming an increasingly relevant factor for institutional effectiveness. Interplay refers to the 
relationship of an institution to and interactions with one or more other institutions (Young 
1996). Interplay can result from functional linkages between the objectives that the different 
agreements pursue or as consequence of institutional design. Functional linkage occurs when 
substantive problems that two or more institutions address are interdependent in 
biogeophysical or socioeconomic terms. They often take the form of side effects or 
unintended byproducts of actions designed to achieve other ends (Young 2002: 112). 
Interdependence exists when a choice of one agent limits the choices of another (Paavola and 
Adger 2005). Similarly, policy objectives are interdependent when the choice of instruments 
for one objective influences the availability of effective instruments for another objective. 
Such functional interdependencies exist between the objectives in many fields of international 
policy, such as trade, environment, security, human rights or development; or within the same 
policy field when different means are chosen without adequate coordination, for example 
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when measures taken to protect the ozone layer have negative impacts on climate change 
(Oberthür 2001). 
Within areas of interdependence, mutual influences exist among agreements, as decisions 
taken in one arena can have a direct influence on decisions taken in another (influence on the 
output level), or affect the behavior with regard to the implementation of another agreement 
and thereby affect its effectiveness (influence on the outcome level) (Oberthür and Gehring 
2006). The impact of interplay can be positive or negative. It is positive when 
interdependence opens up possibilities for synergies in implementation, i.e. the exploitation of 
economies of scale and joint effects in implementation. However, in many cases interplay 
leads to disruption, meaning that there are substantial limitations for joint implementation of 
interdependent agreements. Next to obvious rule conflicts and resulting problems in 
complying with several interrelated agreements at the same time, outcome-level disruption 
can substantially increase the cost of implementation. Such costs are born in the development, 
implementation and enforcement of complex legal systems that are prone to conflict and offer 
manifold loopholes for actor groups to escape from obligations to adapt their behavior to 
internationally agreed regulation.  
Disruptive effects are much more common between agreements in different issue areas 
than within the same policy field (Oberthür and Gehring 2006). Very often, disruptive 
interaction between policy fields is an unintended consequence of a lack of awareness of the 
underlying interdependencies by the negotiators crafting different agreements. This leads to 
the expectation that actors in different issue areas will seek to consolidate their agreements, 
e.g. by amending relevant provisions or developing procedures to manage and mitigate 
negative effects. Disruptive interplay should thus be a temporary phenomenon since both 
sides stand to gain from coordinated and harmonized implementation. In some cases however, 
there is persistent disruption over longer time periods, even though actors are obviously 
becoming aware of the underlying linkages, as well as of possible solutions for reconciliation. 
The conflicts caused by incompatibility in rules can lead to stalemate in international 
negotiations, while lack of alignment can delay implementation, give rise to difficult trade-
offs in domestic policy making, or require complex and costly legislative systems on the 
national level to accommodate conflicting provisions. These effects erode the benefits from 
cooperation. The resolution of such persistent disruptions is thus a fundamental question for 
the effectiveness and efficiency of international governance in the affected issue areas. 
Why do cases of continued disruption occur? In the long run, one would always expect 
negotiations to lead, if not to a resolution of the conflict, to a compromise settlement that 
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reduces the potential for conflict on the outcome level. What are the conditions and 
negotiation scenarios that prevent consolidation? 
As noted above, a common explanation is that some states pursue strategic objectives 
outside of an agreement’s agenda. “States deliberately exploit the disruptive potential of 
functional interdependence in order to circumvent obligations under other agreements, or to 
improve their negotiation positions in other ongoing processes” (Young 2002: 133). This 
explanation is intuitively plausible, nevertheless, the motivation for such a behavior is 
difficult to grasp with a conception of rational, unitary states acting in their self interest. States 
invest considerable amounts of resources in the negotiation of treaties for international 
cooperation. It is conceivable that states may seek to achieve a better bargain in a competing 
forum, but why would they resist mutually beneficial consolidation between conflicting 
agreements in the long run? Furthermore, the cost of continued efforts to circumvent other 
agreements could be substantial in terms of lost reputation and credibility as potential partner 
in other policy fields. 
3 Interplay Between the CBD and TRIPS 
At the basis of interplay between the CBD and TRIPS are divergent interests in the regulation 
of property rights over genetic resources. These interests have been driven by two main 
forces. On one side, there is increasing awareness and scientific agreement that biodiversity is 
being lost at an accelerating rate and that urgent measures are needed to prevent such loss 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). On the other side, new biotechnologies have 
greatly enhanced the potential uses of biodiversity, leading to a sharp increase in economic 
interests in genetic resources as inputs to biotechnological innovations in pharmaceuticals and 
plant breeding. Due to this growing global interest in genetic resources, the international 
discourse on biodiversity conservation has been increasingly marked by the interests of 
suppliers (primarily indigenous and traditional farming communities in countries with high 
rates of biodiversity) and users (pharmaceutical and plant breeding industries in industrialized 
countries) of genetic resources. Supply-related concerns emphasize the need for a mechanism 
that ensures an adequate compensation to the holders of genetic resources and their 
participation in the benefit streams that are generated by the commercial use of their 
resources. Users on the other hand, are predominantly interested in the establishment of 
legally enforceable intellectual property rights over biotechnological innovations (Dutfield 
1999). 
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There are a number of international instruments that address the various facets of 
biodiversity management. Property rights issues have been addressed mostly under the CBD 
and TRIPS.2 The CBD is the most comprehensive institutional framework to address the 
various concerns of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use on the international level. 
Negotiated under the auspices of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), it was adopted in 
1992 and came into force in 1993. Next to the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable 
use of its components, the CBD promotes the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out 
of the use of biodiversity and related traditional knowledge. Particularly the latter objective 
indicates that the interest in international cooperation is not only driven by the concern for 
conservation, but also by the increased economic value of genetic resources as basis for 
biotechnological innovations in the agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors. To this end, the 
CBD grants its member states “national sovereignty” over genetic resources on their territory 
and requires users to obtain the “prior informed consent” of the supplying party before 
accessing its genetic resources. The transfer has to take place on “mutually agreed terms” 
between the supplying party and the user, including arrangements to realize the suppliers’ 
right to benefit sharing (Article 15). 
The concerns of genetic resource users are addressed by the TRIPS agreement, which 
requires all WTO members to make intellectual property rights available in all areas of 
technology, including biotechnology (Article 27.3b). Plant varieties may alternatively be 
protected by a sui generis system, however, the expectation is that such a system meets the 
basic criteria of intellectual property protection, namely the granting of temporary exclusive 
marketing rights to allow plant breeders to recoup the investments made in research and 
development.3 TRIPS came into force with the establishment of the WTO in 1994. Its general 
objective is to harmonize intellectual property rights systems in order to facilitate trade in 
                                                 
2  Other important agreements include the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) and 
the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which was recently replaced by the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA). Furthermore, negotiations at the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore under the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and CBD’s Working Group on Access and Benefit 
Sharing are expected to lead to the adoption of new international instruments. We focus on the relationship between the 
CBD and TRIPS for illustrative purposes. A specific analysis of interplay among international institutions regulating 
property rights over genetic resources would need to include these agreements and processes. 
3  The expression sui generis indicates an idea, an entity or a reality that cannot be included in a wider concept. In 
intellectual property law, rights may be sui generis to owners of a small class of works, such as intellectual property 
rights in mask works, ship hull designs, databases, or plant species. Sui generis systems for plant variety protection may 
thus deviate from the wider IPRs applicable in a country, such as patents, trademarks or copyrights. 
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goods and services that require a legal protection of intellectual property rights. With regard 
to genetic resources, TRIPS focuses on the protection of new knowledge, while the aim of the 
CBD is to secure the ownership rights of those who have contributed to the development and 
conservation of existing genetic resources, and who continue to safeguard the ecosystems 
needed for the conservation and development of genetic resources in the future (Dutfield 
1999).  
The TRIPS agreement does not explicitly recognize the CBD provisions on access and 
benefit sharing. Its provisions are much more tailored to the situation prevailing before the 
CBD came into force, when genetic resources were essentially managed as open access 
resource.4 Furthermore, the general WTO principles of national treatment and most favored 
nation treatment make it difficult to discriminate between users adhering to the CBD 
principles and those who do not when designing legislation for access and use of a country’s 
genetic resources. Theoretically a violation of the TRIPS agreement in that sense could be 
pursued in front of the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO and eventually lead to 
economic sanctions against the supplying country. In practice this has not yet occurred, 
however, the anticipation of economic sanctions may lead countries to give priority to TRIPS 
even though it may be much more in their interest to fully implement the mechanisms of the 
CBD. 
An effective implementation of the CBD requires legal action by supplier as well as user 
countries. On the supplier side, countries need to regulate access to genetic resources in such a 
way that it is only granted to users who comply with the conditions of prior informed consent 
and benefit sharing, while preventing access by those who do not. These regulations could be 
supported by user countries through legislation inhibiting the import of genetic resources if it 
does not comply with these criteria (Rosendal 1999; Rosendal 2006). So far there have been 
little efforts by user countries to do so.5 As TRIPS does not provide for access restrictions on 
the basis of criteria other than those referenced in Article 27, supplier countries may find 
themselves in violation of TRIPS when trying to implement the CBD. In contrast, the CBD 
states that IPR regulation should be applied in a way that does not run counter to the 
                                                 
4  While access was unregulated for genetic resources in general, FAO resolution 6/81 declared that plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture should be regarded as “common heritage” to which access should remain free and unrestricted. 
In 1991, one year prior to the negotiation of the CBD, this status was changed by FAO resolution 3/91 placing genetic 
resources under the sovereignty of the state on whose territory they are found. This concept of national property was 
embraced by the CBD by placing the state as principle actor responsible for the conservation of genetic resources. 
5  With the exception of Denmark, Switzerland and a few other European countries who require the disclosure of origin of 
genetic resources in patent applications. 
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objectives of the CBD (Article 16.5). In a strict sense, any user country providing for the 
application of IPRs to genetic resources or their commercial derivatives without providing for 
benefit sharing would therefore be in violation of the CBD. 
The incompatibility of the two agreements thus arises out of their different systems for the 
definition of property rights over genetic resources on the one hand, and the establishment of 
intellectual property rights over their commercial use on the other. For many countries that are 
predominantly suppliers of genetic resources the joint implementation of these provisions has 
turned out to be a complicated challenge that often leads to conflicts over the use of their 
genetic resources. This does not mean that a full and non-disruptive implementation of the 
two instruments is impossible; however, it does require complex legal and regulatory systems 
that are beyond the capacity of many developing countries. In any case, the transaction costs 
caused by these incompatibilities are likely to offset the desired incentives for genetic 
resource conservation, regardless of a country’s capacity to establish legal procedures to 
address conflicts arising out of the different property rights systems. 
A way out of this dilemma would be an amendment of the TRIPS agreement to recognize 
the suppliers’ rights as defined by the CBD, thus obliging users to provide information about 
the origin of a genetic resource, a proof of prior informed consent and of mutually agreed 
terms in patent applications (Correa 2003; Carvalho 2005). Submissions in this regard have 
been made repeatedly by supplier countries, without much success.6 
The main question that we seek to explore is why to date there have been no serious 
negotiations aiming at a reconciliation of TRIPS and the CBD and why initiatives in this 
regard have so far not been successful. What are the constraints that prevent reconciliation? 
4 Incompatibility of Property Rights Systems 
In order to understand the interplay between the CBD and TRIPS with regard to their 
provisions on property rights over genetic resources, it is necessary to understand the nature 
of the interdependence of the different property rights systems envisaged by the two 
agreements. In institutional economics the concept of interdependence refers to agents with 
competing interests in scarce environmental resources. Since they cannot simultaneously 
realize their diverging interests, their conflict must be resolved by defining (or re-defining) 
resource endowments or entitlements to resource use (Paavola and Adger 2005). This can be 
                                                 
6  See footnote 1. 
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done by specifying private property rights as in the so-called ‘Coase Theorem’ (Coase 1960) 
or by establishing environmental regulations which create other kinds of rights. Concern 
about environmental scarcity or adverse environmental impacts is, however, not the primary 
force that drives the definition of property rights. The main force is the discovery of new 
technologies that allow the creation of greater value in novel products, which spurs the 
demand for the creation of new property rights. Harold Demsetz has argued that “property 
rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than 
the cost of internalization. Increased internalization in the main, results from changes in 
economic values, changes which stem from the development of new technology and the 
opening of new markets, changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned” (Demsetz 
1967: 350).  
In general terms, the development of the CBD and TRIPS can be interpreted as a process 
of property rights definition over two different types of genetic resources driven by two 
different concerns. While the CBD seeks to define property rights over “raw” genetic 
resources in their natural state – driven by concerns for their conservation and sustainable use; 
TRIPS establishes new forms of intellectual property rights over “worked” genetic resources 
that are built through improvements in the plant genome (plant breeding), or other innovations 
drawing directly on biological information (Raustiala and Victor 2004). In other words, the 
CBD seeks to develop a property rights system that secures the resource base, whereas TRIPS 
aims at the protection of the rights of those who invest in the development and marketing of 
commercial applications of these resources. According to the Coase Theorem, the attainment 
of maximum social welfare (efficiency) is invariant to the initial assignment of property 
rights, so long as property rights are well defined and the individuals involved are able to 
transact with one another to re-allocate the property rights efficiently (Coase 1960). This 
requires that property rights are defined in such way that they can be transferred fully or in 
parts between all actors involved in the creation and marketing of an economic good. The 
theorem however, is unrealistic in two points. First, it is based on the assumption of zero 
transaction costs. The initial allocation is irrelevant only as long as the transfer of property 
rights and the transfer of associated resources or goods are costless. When the activity 
involves two or more individuals that are separated in space or time, the costs of transacting 
between them might be too high to obtain efficiency. Then the final outcome crucially 
depends on the specific nature of the initial allocation of the rights.  
Second, while Coase predicts that the efficiency of property rights does not depend on their 
initial allocation, the distribution of benefits certainly does. These distributional effects are 
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relevant when the initial allocation is not given by a fact of nature, but subject to negotiation. 
Gary Libecap argues that since property rights define “the distribution of wealth and political 
power, [...] the distribution of wealth and power inherent in the proposed rights structure will 
be a source of dispute” (Libecap 1989: 215). Furthermore, “[t]he calculation of individual 
expected net gains will determine who will be the actors of change, who will be its opponents, 
and the range of political bargaining that will occur in the process of altering PR institutions” 
(Libecap 1989: 216). 
The first intervention leads to the recognition that the specification and initial allocation of 
property rights does matter for the overall efficiency of the property rights system because it 
affects the scope of transaction costs and determines who will bear these costs. The second 
point adds to this that the expected benefits of the definition or re-definition of property rights 
will attract exactly those actors who stand to gain or loose from the changes under 
negotiation. Each group of actors will opt for the arrangement that is most beneficial for them. 
This further leads to the conclusion that actors who are affected by property rights changes in 
different ways will most likely opt for different property rights arrangements.  
 
 
Figure 1:  The Vertical Industry Chain of Genetic Resource Use  
Source: based on Swanson and Goeschl 2000 
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Suppliers and users of genetic resources can be pictured to be part of a vertical industry chain 
that makes use of genetic information. A vertical industry model depicts the chain of 
production required to move the product from the stage of an initial idea through production 
and into the hands of the consumer. In very general terms, industries that use genetic 
resources, such as plant breeding or pharmaceutical firms consist of at least four stages (see 
Figure 1) (Swanson and Goeschl 2000). 
• At the basis of the chain ‘new’ genetic resources develop naturally through the process of 
‘natural selection;’ only those organisms which are able to survive under a given 
environment remain and reproduce. 
• The next stage of the industry consists of the individuals who observe the natural process 
of selection and aid in the dissemination of its information. ‘Traditional farmers,’ for 
instance, make discriminative choices that lead to a further selection of desirable traits 
among those plant individuals that have survived natural selection. Other actors make 
choices that affect the development of medicinal plants, while yet others decide whether to 
conserve natural ecosystems or to convert them to other uses. All these actors affect the 
supply of genetic resources since their creation and conservation depends on the choices 
they make. Whether they act in fact as suppliers depends on the definition and initial 
allocation of property rights at this stage of the industry. 
• The ‘biotech industry’ makes use of the accumulated stock as well as the continuous flow 
of genetic resources to develop new products. Plant breeders use the set of varieties that 
farmers have created over long periods of time to produce ‘improved’ varieties that deliver 
high yields under the conditions of ‘modern’ agriculture. Others use genetic information to 
develop substances or materials that become part of new medicines, or other 
biotechnological innovations. 
• The consumers of biotechnological products are on the one hand ‘modern farmers’ who 
make use of the improved plant varieties to produce food and other products destined for 
final consumption. Other biotechnological products may either be consumed directly or 
serve as intermediate input other production processes. 
At each stage of the industry chain, property rights must be defined in such a way that 
resources or intermediate products can be transferred smoothly from one stage to another. 
Different branches of biotechnological industries may include additional intermediate stages, 
such as gene banks or firms specialized in bioprospecting or basic research. Nevertheless, the 
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most relevant transfers requiring international regulation of property rights occur between 
suppliers and users on the hand (transfer of ‘raw’ genetic resources), and between users and 
consumers on the other (transfer of ‘worked’ genetic resources). 
The main challenge is now, to define and allocate property rights that can be redistributed 
efficiently along the industry chain. The idea behind the Coase Theorem is that the allocation 
of the property rights at some stage of the industry chain will lead to their efficient 
distribution, simply because the initial rights holder will value the rights less than the most 
efficient rights holder. Society wants the rights to be in the hands of the agent who is best able 
to generate a flow of highly valued goods and services from them, and it is this value that will 
warrant the highest bid. Therefore, the initial allocation of the rights is irrelevant, so long as 
the costs of moving them toward the highest bidder are not prohibitive. In the case of genetic 
resources, TRIPS places the property rights in the information generated within the industry at 
the user stage, where they are implicit in the exclusive marketing rights to biotechnological 
innovations given to the industry by means of intellectual property rights. According to the 
Coase Theorem, the predicted outcome would be that users become the ‘managers’ of the 
entire industry chain by distributing the property rights across the industry in a manner that 
creates incentives for the efficient supply of genetic resources (Swanson and Goeschl 2000). 
The rights holder would allocate property rights at those levels of the industry that are seen as 
important to the maximization of the value of the industry. 
However, in parallel to the definition of property rights at the ‘user’ stage of the industry, 
the CBD has created property rights at the ‘supplier’ stage. This is implicit in the notion of 
national sovereignty over genetic resources and the provisions that access should be subject to 
prior informed consent and on mutually agreed terms. This effectively allows states to define 
property rights over raw genetic resources in their own terms. They may, for instance, decide 
to transfer the initial property right to local communities by requiring their prior informed 
consent as a precondition for granting access at the national level. This parallel allocation of 
property rights creates uncertainty and monitoring problems at both stages of the industry. 
While suppliers have little means to control the use of their genetic resources once access has 
been granted, users face the risk of loosing their investments into the conservation of genetic 
resources in supplier countries as a result of national access legislation in those countries. 
Moreover, if they should discover and commercialize a new valuable substance in a sample, 
they cannot rely on an exclusive use right since the supplier may decide to sell the same 
genetic information to other users. 
14  Stefan Jungcurt, Thomas Meyer 
The reason for this mutual inability to control lies in the nature of genetic resources as 
information resource. The public good characteristics of information resources require that 
property rights to new information embodied in innovative products include an extended 
exclusive right of control over its subsequent use and marketing. Since both stages of the 
industry generate new information in the form of raw and worked genetic resources, the 
transfer of property rights must include a mechanism that ensures the recognition of these 
control rights across all stages of the industry. The parallel allocation of initial property rights 
through TRIPS and the CBD implies different pathways for their reallocation along the 
industry chain. Under the CBD, suppliers would develop mechanisms to control the 
subsequent use and marketing of their information resources upstream, whereas under TRIPS, 
users would make downstream investments in the provision of such resources for their 
exclusive use. Both pathways may eventually lead to similar mechanisms for the exchange of 
genetic resources, however with different allocations of benefits. Obviously, two systems 
cannot exist at the same time, particularly if they imply opposite allocations of benefits, 
without giving rise to fundamental disputes about whose right to benefit prevails in a given 
situation. The high number of disputes over the commercial use of genetic resources, often 
entitled ‘biopiracy’ cases, illustrates this problem. In addition, the risk to become subject to 
such a dispute most likely leads actors on both sides to shy away from making desirable 
investments and performing the transactions needed to conserve and use genetic resources. 
In summary, property rights arrangements over raw and worked genetic resources are 
interdependent in the sense that the choice of a property arrangement on one side substantially 
narrows down the choices available on the other side that would yield a generally efficient 
outcome. The incompatibility of the two systems defined by the CBD and TRIPS is to a large 
extent responsible for the disruptions occurring in the implementation of the two agreements. 
It has two main effects: First, it raises transaction costs of international transfers of genetic 
resources because it necessitates the creation of costly legal interfaces between the different 
systems; and second, it prevents desirable transfers of genetic resources and investments in 
conservation because the coexistence of the two systems leads to legal insecurity of property 
rights. 
The principle question is now, whether actors in the two processes are aware of this 
incompatibility and its consequences, and if so, what prevents them from negotiating a 
consolidated agreement that would realize remaining gains from cooperation through the 
securing of property rights and their efficient transfer. 
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5 A Stylized Model of Negotiations in Different Arenas on Interdependent 
Issues 
In this section we develop a stylized model to analyze the incentives for strategic behavior in 
cases of disruptive interplay between international institutional arrangements. We base our 
explanation on the dynamics of domestic decision making as determinants of international 
negotiation strategies. Following the Two-level Games model of international negotiations 
developed by Putnam (1988) and others, (e.g. Milner 1997; Keisuke 1996; Tarar 2001) we 
conceptualize the international negotiator as actor whose decision making is constrained on 
two sides – on the international level to the set of solutions that represent agreeable 
compromise and on the domestic level to the set of solutions that domestic actors will support 
(Putnam 1988; Milner 1997). We view governments as complex organizations where sub-
actors pursue multiple and to some extent conflicting objectives, and where policy decisions 
are a weighted aggregate of sub-actor preferences (Underdal and Hanf 2000). 
Furthermore, we assume that negotiations in different issue areas are dominated by 
different actors. “Because of the move to international cooperation on previously domestic 
policy issues it is no longer foreign ministries that dominate international diplomacy: instead, 
a number of domestic agencies, often with quite distinct agendas, increasingly play active 
roles” (Slaughter 1997). Negotiators report to different ministries and are each confronted 
with the interests and demands of a particular set of domestic interest groups. They are 
appointed by their governments or delegated by national agencies but they act as agents of 
particular groups. Their domestic support is determined by the impact of international 
regulation on specific sectors of society and the strength of the intermediate actors in this 
sector, rather than by general voting behavior. Many international organizations can therefore 
be seen as convening structures of horizontal networks of national officials. “Specialized 
international organizations, such as those negotiating and administering most multilateral 
environmental agreements, have long been a forum for meetings of the relevant national 
ministers” (Slaughter 2004). Governments are fragmented in their representation within the 
different regimes involved and thus solutions that emerge in one forum often do not map well 
onto the interests represented in other forums (Raustiala and Victor 2004). 
In our case, representatives of environment ministries dominate the CBD. They are 
supported by environmentalist groups on the one hand, and organizations and networks of 
suppliers on the other. Supplier groups dominate in resource-rich developing countries, while 
environmentalist groups play an important role in industrialized countries. The interests of 
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these two groups converge to some extent on the issue of access and benefit sharing, since 
most environmental groups view market based mechanisms that allocate a share of benefits to 
suppliers as effective means to provide incentives for genetic resource conservation. Supplier 
groups for their part support access and benefit sharing as means to achive a more equitable 
distribution of benefits from the use of genetic resources.7 
Trade negotiators, industry groups and intellectual property lawyers are concentrated in the 
negotiations at the TRIPS council, where they represent the interests of ‘knowledge-based’ 
industries, such as enterprises in software and computer businesses, entertainment, 
pharmaceuticals, plant breeding and many others. Their main concern is the establishment and 
international recognition of standards for intellectual property protection over knowledge-
based innovations (Raustiala and Victor 2004: 291). 
It is important to note that interest groups on both sides have developed powerful 
international networks that coordinate the activities of domestic groups, provide forums for 
information exchange and strategy development, and actively participate in international 
negotiations. Under the CBD, supplier NGOs such as the Internatioal Indigenous Forum on 
Biodiversity (IIFB) or the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon 
Bassin (COICA) are able to effectively influence negotiations. Since the official delegations 
of many biodiversity-rich countries include representatives of domestic indigenous and 
supplier organizations, the proposals made by IIFB and COICA are often endorsed by such 
countries. At the CBD’s seventh conference of the parties, for instance, a threat by indigenous 
organizations to withdraw their support if their demands were ignored resulted in the 
inclusion of references to indigenous rights in the negotiating text (IISD 2004). Access for 
such NGO networks to negotiations is easier under the CBD and they generally have a 
stronger standing than in the TRIPS council. Therefore, the extent of direct lobbying at the 
international level can be expected to be stronger at the CBD than at TRIPS.  
Suppose that in the initial situation no property rights over raw or worked genetic resources 
are defined on the international level. Access to raw genetic resources is unregulated resulting 
in an open access situation, while there is no form of universally recognized intellectual 
                                                 
7  Supplier and environmentalist groups thus agree on the principle of access and benefit sharing, but not necessarily on its 
terms. They place different priorities on the realization of actual transfers of benefits towards suppliers. Countries with 
strong environmentalist movements, such as most EU countries, New Zealand or Canada, support benefit sharing as one 
among other mechanisms encouraging conservation, whereas countries with strong supplier organizations, such as many 
Latin American or African countries, put much more emphasis on provisions ensuring that benefits will reach suppliers, 
including access subject to the prior informed consent of supplier groups and on the basis of mutually agreed terms. (see 
IISD 2005; 2006) 
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property right over biotechnological innovations. Since both raw and worked genetic 
resources have the character of a public good, they are both likely to be supplied at a sub-
optimal level. On both ends of the industry chain substantial gains can be achieved through 
the definition and enforcement of transferable property rights over genetic resources and their 
products. International transferability of property rights over raw genetic resources is 
essential, because the actors engaged in their supply and use are located in different countries, 
necessitating international rules and standards for how property rights are defined, transferred 
and enforced across country borders.  
As mentioned above, according to the Coase Theorem any initial allocation of property 
rights between suppliers and users will be efficient as long as they are fully defined and fully 
transferable. The initial allocations that meet these criteria are depicted as a transformation 
curve in Figure 2. All points on the curve yield maximum benefits from an internationally 
recognized system of property rights arrangements. The position on the curve represents the 
distributional effect of different initial allocations. An arrangement that is located on the 
upper left part of the curve will channel a large proportion of benefits to users, whereas a 
position on the lower right distributes the majority of benefits to suppliers. At the Status Quo 
(SQ) no international regulation on property rights exists on either side. Both users and 
suppliers will benefit from the definition and enforcement of property rights but they prefer 
different distributions of the resulting benefits. Their preferences are illustrated by 
indifference curves and each side has its optimum where the transformation curve touches the 
outermost indifference curve, i.e. in U* for users and S* for suppliers. 
If both sides engage independently in the negotiation of international agreements for 
property rights regulation, and if they are unaware of the interdependence of property rights 
arrangements, they will seek solutions that maximize their own utility. Representatives of 
users will choose the WTO as forum where they meet with their counterparts from other 
countries to adopt an international treaty on intellectual property rights (TRIPS, situated at U* 
in Figure 2). At UNEP, representatives of environmental ministries meet to negotiate a broad 
convention on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, including provisions on 
access and benefit sharing (CBD, at S*). At these points both sides expect to receive 
maximum benefits from international cooperation. 
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Figure 2:  A Stylized Model of Negotiations in Two Arenas on Functionally 
Interdependent Issues  
Source: compiled by the authors 
Ratification of the two agreements by national parliaments should not be a problem, given 
that at this point the negotiators themselves are unaware of the incompatibilities and will 
therefore promote the agreements with the support of their constituent groups. Furthermore, 
the interdependent provisions of the two agreements come as parts of larger package deals 
that deviate attention from potential overlaps. As implementation proceeds, constituents on 
both sides will gradually realize that they are not receiving the benefits they were expecting. 
The incompatibilities between the agreements raise transaction costs and diminish the scope 
of cooperation. Both sides receive far less utility than expected. The ‘real’ utility levels are 
those at U’ and S’. 
The negotiators now have a problem. Since they are acting as agents of the constituent 
groups, they will now be held accountable for the outcome. The negotiators ‘promised’ 
benefits corresponding to U* and S*, but they ‘delivered’ only U’ and S’. The constituents 
will each view ‘their’ agreement as a legitimate recognition of their claims at the international 
level. User groups, for instance, will perceive CBD provisions as an unlawful distortion of 
their genuine right to receive IPR protection over their innovations. Both sides are not 
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prepared to accept that the other agreement should reduce their benefits. This ‘contract 
illusion’ on the side of the constituent groups creates a dilemma situation for the negotiator. 
From the perspective of the ‘real’ benefits that are generated in U’ and S’ it would be 
desirable to negotiate a consolidated agreement that moves international regulation back to 
the transformation curve and realizes remaining benefits from cooperation. Such an 
agreement, depicted by E° in Figure 2, would make both sides better off in real terms (yielding 
benefits equivalent to i°U > i’U and i°S > i’S). The constituents however will perceive such an 
agreement as a loss compared to the (illusionary) benefits they are expecting (i°U < i*U and i°S 
< i*S). 
What can the negotiator do in such a situation? Theoretically there are three strategies by 
which the negotiator can attempt to solve the problem: 
• Admit: The negotiator can decide to play with open cards and try to persuade the 
constituents that their expected benefits are unrealistic, but that they can make some 
improvements by accepting the existence of the other agreement and moving towards 
consolidation. This will lead to an adjustment in the expectations of the constituent groups, 
i.e. the contract illusion disappears. If this strategy is chosen by negotiators on both sides it 
will open the way for the (re-) negotiation of consolidated agreements, leading to an 
outcome similar to E° in Figure 2. This strategy is risky, however, since the constituents 
might not be willing to adjust their expectations or believe that the negotiator is pursuing a 
personal agenda rather than representing their interests when proposing such a strategy. 
They can threaten to withdraw support or pressure for the replacement of the person who is 
negotiating on their behalf. 
• Ignore: The negotiator can pretend to remain unaware of the underlying incompatibilities 
of the agreements and adopt the view that the other agreement contains badly defined 
provisions that lead to unnecessary and illegitimate interferences. The constituents are 
more likely to accept this view and will support the negotiator’s efforts to clarify the 
relationship between the agreements with a view to clearly mark their claims. On the 
international level, the negotiator can push for the introduction of special savings clauses 
and collision rules that determine which agreement prevails in different situations. If both 
sides choose this strategy, the result will be a legal delimitation of the two agreements. 
This has some positive effect on the outcome since uncertainty and transaction costs in 
case of conflict are reduced, however a substantial proportion of the potential gains from 
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cooperation will remain unexploited, since the underlying incompatibilities are not 
removed. The outcome in this case will be a gradual movement towards E’ in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Strategic Gains  
Source: compiled by the authors 
 
• Reinforce: Finally, the negotiator can actively support the expectations of the constituents, 
thereby maintaining or even increasing the extent of contract illusion. At the same time she 
can try to persuade the constituents of the other side that their agreement is the only cause 
of the disruptions because their expectations are unrealistic. In this case, the negotiator 
speculates on the reduction of contract illusion on the other side. If, for instance, the TRIPS 
negotiators succeed in persuading supplier and environmental groups that the ‘real’ utility 
of their initial agreement (i’S) is the maximum possible gain they can expect from 
international cooperation, they could reap most of the remaining, yet unexploited, benefits 
by proposing ‘consolidation on their terms’. This case is depicted in the point U*’ in 
Figure 3. Since in this case suppliers accept any agreement that maintains their initial 
utility of i’S, users can move to the point where i’S intersects with the transformation curve 
(U*’), at which users receive a benefit only slightly below their initial expectations but 
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significantly higher than under the initial two agreements. Obviously, this strategy will 
only be successful if negotiators of the supplier side chose ‘admit’. If they choose ‘ignore’, 
users may be able to achieve some advantage, but most of this will be offset by a failure to 
reach the transformation curve. The worst outcome can be expected when both sides 
choose ‘reinforce.’ Then neither delimitation nor consolidation is possible and the outcome 
is stalemate (see Table 1). 
Table 1:  The Negotiation Dilemma in Functionally Interdependent Agreements  
  Negotiator Agreement A 
  Admit Ignore Reinforce 
Admit Consolidation Some gains for A Strong gains for A 
Ignore Some gains for B Delimitation Some gains for A 
Negotiator 
Agreement 
B 
Reinforce Strong gains        for B Some gains for B Stalemate 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
The strategy choices of the negotiators depend on two factors: (1) the expected reaction of 
their own constituent groups and their standing against the negotiator (or the respective 
domestic agency); and (2) the anticipated strategy choice by the negotiators of the competing 
agreement. A strong constituent group increases the risk a negotiator faces when choosing 
‘admit,’ while it strengthens her position when choosing ‘ignore’ or ‘reinforce.’ A weak 
constituent group, on the other hand, is more likely to be persuaded. The negotiator may 
perceive it less risky to choose ‘admit,’ but at the same time this would send a signal of 
vulnerability and increase the chances of being persuaded if negotiators on the other side 
choose ‘reinforce.’ This means that a negotiator will choose admit only when she can be sure 
that the other side does the same. In this case however, she would be tempted to choose 
reinforce to exploit the weakness of the other side’s constituents. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
either side will unilaterally choose admit in order to open up a way for consolidation. If the 
own constituent group is perceived to be strong and the other seen as relatively weak, 
negotiators may attempt to choose ‘reinforce.’ Once they become aware that the other side 
does not choose admit, however, they will be inclined to switch to ‘ignore’. As Table 1 
shows, interdependence between two independently negotiated agreements creates a 
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consolidation dilemma for the negotiators. The most desirable outcome for all parties can be 
achieved only if both sides choose ‘admit’ simultaneously. 
Under these circumstances, the outcome will almost always be delimitation, in some cases 
preceded by a certain period of stalemate during which negotiators on one or on both sides 
might test their ability to influence the supporters of their opponents. In the long run, 
delimitation is the dominant equilibrium. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that 
negotiators do not determine their strategies alone, but will have to adjust to the positions 
taken by their counterparts from other countries. Even if a large number should be willing to 
choose admit, those who face particularly strong or particularly weak constituent groups will 
always veto this choice. 
In game-theoretic terms, ‘delimitation’ is the result of dominant non-cooperative strategies. 
The cooperative outcome, which would yield a higher total utility, cannot be achieved 
because both sides have incentives to unilaterally switch to a non-cooperative strategy 
(reinforce) to reap a higher share of the benefits from cooperation. In the absence of external 
influences that would change the strategic structure of the situation, delimitation is the 
maximum outcome that can be achieved in situations of disruptive interplay due to functional 
interdependence. The consolidation of functionally interdependent agreements can thus be 
prevented by the strategic situation that is created in cases in which negotiations take place in 
isolation of each other and in which negotiators act as agents of different sets of constituent 
groups rather than as representatives of the whole state. 
6 Discussion 
Our model rests on the assumption that negotiators and constituents are unaware of the 
interdependence of the issues they are negotiating until agreements on both sides have been 
adopted. This implies that initially incompatibilities and interactions between the agreements 
are unintended. A study by Oberthür and Gehring (2006) shows that in all cases of 
institutional interplay resulting in disruption the interaction was unintended. Negotiators may 
however have anticipated institutional interaction to a certain extent, but decided not to avoid 
it because the cost of doing so was considered higher than the benefits. In the case of the 
CBD-TRIPS relationship, interaction was clearly anticipated during the negotiation process, 
leading even to some minor adjustments in the two agreements (Rosendal 2006).8 
                                                 
8  These are the sui generis option for the protection of new plant varieties in TRIPS Article 27.3b, and the CBD Article 
16.5 stating that the IPR should not run counter to the objectives of the convention. Both clauses have been introduced 
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Nevertheless, these changes did not resolve the underlying interdependence of property rights 
and thus contributed little to reduce the potential for disruption during implementation. 
This raises two questions. (1) To what extent can negotiators assess the impact of 
interdependencies before agreements are adopted? (2) What are their ex-ante expectations to 
make strategic gains in efforts to consolidate agreements after adoption? If they underestimate 
the disruptive potential of interdependencies they may not consider it worthwhile to make 
efforts to align treaties before adoption. If, on the other hand, they expect a high degree of 
disruption and at the same time think that the constituents on the other side are relatively 
weak, they may expect to make significant gains after the agreements have been adopted. In 
this case, they maybe tempted to accept a higher level of interdependence than necessary. In 
other words, negotiators with (seemingly) strong constituent groups may be inclined to 
strategically postpone consolidation in order to open up room for (re)negotiation on more 
advantageous terms after the adoption of the agreements has ‘locked in’ the interdependence 
and made disruptive losses a reality. This would represent an interesting variant of Putnam’s 
argument that the negotiator can use international pressures to “do what they privately whish 
to do, but are powerless to do domestically” (Putnam 1988: 457). The negotiator could use the 
combination of a strong constituent group that expects a high level of utility and the negative 
effect of disruption as leverage to force the other side to accept an agreement on his terms. In 
this case he would use the strength and expectations of his own constituents as argument that 
any less favorable consolidation would be difficult to implement, while he can point towards 
the disruptive losses to argue that no consolidation would be even worse. When pursuing such 
a strategy the negotiator would seek to maximize contract illusion among his constituents 
already before the adoption of the initial agreements and maintain it as high as possible during 
the consolidation phase. 
The strategy will, however, only be successful if the negotiator assesses the weakness of 
the opponent’s constituents and his ability to influence his own supporters correctly. Any 
overestimation of his capabilities will inevitably lead to stalemate, followed by delimitation. 
The defense strategy by the negotiators of the targeted agreement will be to push contract 
illusion on their side, since this is the most effective way to prevent persuasion among their 
constituents. This has the effect that constituents on both sides maintain unrealistic 
                                                                                                                                                        
towards the end of the negotiation processes. In the case of TRIPS the adjustment seeks to provide some flexibility to 
accommodate the concerns of suppliers, whereas the introduction of CBD Article 16.5 clearly represents an effort to 
delimit the scope of IPR protection (Rosendal 2006). 
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expectations about their benefits from cooperation, making an alignment of the two 
agreements even less likely. 
The rhetoric of contract illusion is evident in the high number of reports, policy papers and 
studies that are published in the context of negotiations. In the CBD-TRIPS case, an 
abundance of papers exists that highlight the dangers of biopiracy on one side, and the 
negative welfare effects of strict access and benefit sharing provisions on the other. Yet very 
little is known about the ‘real’ economic benefits that are to be distributed. On both sides 
actors have incentives not to disclose information in this regard in order not to weaken their 
negotiation positions. The effect is that high uncertainty prevails over the benefits each side 
can realistically expect as well as over the loss due to disruptive interplay. 
7 Conclusion 
Our analysis reveals, that stalemate or lack of consolidation in cases of disruptive interplay 
between international institutions is not necessarily due to the constellation of large 
negotiation blocks that can be assumed to have broadly similar interests, such as the ‘North’ 
and the ‘South’. Persistent disruption is more likely a consequence of heterogeneous domestic 
interests that are ‘transmitted’ to the international level via different networks of government 
agencies and their negotiators. Contract illusion on the side of the constituent groups can 
induce a situation in which negotiators are unable to initiate consolidation, because such 
initiatives will either lead to a loss of support from the constituents or be exploited by the 
negotiators of the competing agreement. Moreover, negotiators may be tempted to 
strategically postpone consolidation to the implementation phase when they can expect to 
negotiate consolidation on terms favoring the interests of their constituent groups. 
The conceptual approach viewing negotiators in specialized international agreements as 
agents of particular domestic interest groups, rather as representative of the state as a whole, 
allows a deeper analysis of the domestic determinants of developments in international 
regulation. For instance, our findings merit a more detailed analysis of the conditions under 
which negotiators can take promising initiatives to resolve stalemate or make proposals for 
reconciliation. In the recent negotiations for an international regime on access and benefit 
sharing under the auspices of the CBD, the negotiators of some countries have reported on 
their submissions and positions in other processes, including at the TRIPS council and various 
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forums of the World Intellectual Property Organization (IISD 2005).9 This could be an 
indication for efforts to coordinate negotiations in different issue areas on the national or 
regional level. A deeper analysis of the constituent-negotiator dynamics in these countries 
could reveal, if and how changes in the influence of and coalitions among domestic groups 
affect the chances for resolving cases of disruptive interplay on the international level. 
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